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A Semiotic Analysis of If we are holding
hands, whose hand am I holding?
Martin Wheatman
Withinreap Barn, Moss Side Lane, Preston, United Kingdom
This paper presents a system which asserts understand-
ing of complex utterances by semiotic analysis. The
question in the title was chosen because: it enquires
about a conceptual state of affairs, referring to in two
ways; and reaches an answer by subtracting I from we to
get the unspoken you. The system introduces concepts,
that about which we can speak, defined by repertoires
in natural language, including phrasal analysis patterns.
The repertoire conceptualization grounds it on a state of
affairs against which reasoning can be performed. On
matching an utterance, associated intentions are inter-
nally vocalized; thus, concepts are informed by more
specific concepts. The repertoire conceptualism allows
hypothetical states of affairs to be constructed, such as in
the title question.
Keywords: semiotics, utterance, linguistic information
system, machine understanding
1. Introduction
The embodied approach to intelligent systems
has received much interest in recent years (Goth
2011, Pfeifer et al 2012); hardly a month goes
by without reference to driver-less cars, me-
chanical bipedalism or empathetic automata.
Their advantage over disembodied systems is
that they supposedly have a grounding in the real
world, enabling them to interact more success-
fully with that environment (Steels 2008); how-
ever, disembodied problems, like understanding
the title question, remain. In a world of me-
chanical devices, if such a device learns to hold
hands and is aware of a hand holding situation,
it may still fail to comprehend the title question
since it is possible that we cannot hold hands:
perhaps you are a double amputee, or we have
only ever met over the Internet. The same prob-
lem, if at a different scale, is found with systems
that attempt to model the neural structure of the
brain: it builds a phenomenal truth, not a con-
ceptual truth. Further, embodied approaches
remain disparate systems – the notion of com-
puter as universal machine requires the use of
the universal medium: language.
The interest in embodied systems is fuelled by a
failure of disembodied systems to make inroads
into understanding. Systems such as ELIZA
(Weizenbaum, 1966) and typical chatbot en-
trants to the Turing Test (Loebner, 2013), at
best only have a shallow understanding and at
worst are positively evasive. Since this project
started, Apple have released SIRI on their mo-
bile platform (Apple, 2013), a natural language
understanding tool, but one which does not
understand the title question; further, Google
has announced Hummingbird (Google, 2013),
a concept based approach to search. The web
search approach (IBM, 2012) will presumably
fail if no answer can be found on the Internet.
No answer is defined in this paper; indeed, there
is no definitive answer to this context-sensitive
question, although one is given in the exam-
ple. Even systems which are useful, such as
booking system (VocalIQ, 2014), or banking In-
teractive Voice Response systems (PhoneBank,
2014), are dedicated to a particular task, so
a more complex comprehension, as sought by
this paper, cannot be ascertained. Perhaps the
most remarkable system in this area, since the
dawn of computing, is SHRDLU (Winograd
1972) which makes sense of a limited world of
blocks. This project, however, deals with signs,
metaphors addressing the real world, rather than
blocks.
The simplest sign model is of a sign, or sig-
nifier, which forms a signified mental concept
in the mind (Saussure, 1915). This paper fol-
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lows the more comprehensive sign model of
Charles Sanders Peirce, described in Section
2. Zemanek made the first connection between
Information Systems and Semiotics (Zemanek
1966), an approach taken more fully by Eco
(Eco, 1976). Semiotics was also used by Stam-
per in describing Business Information Systems
(Stamper, 1973). Further, he modelled infor-
mation as a triadic sign (Stamper 1985). Since
then the various approaches to Signs in IS has
been directed at the design of IS and their inter-
action with society, in what is more commonly
known as Organizational Semiotics (Andersen,
1997; Stamper, 2001; Liu, 2000). A return
to the semiotics of source code as a system
of textual signs was presented in (Tanaka-Ishii,
2010).
This paper’s novel approach applies semiotics to
natural language understanding, by modelling
in software the signs that represent utterances.
It shows that complex utterances can be ana-
lyzed by Semiotics, using phrases which inform
utterance interpretation, such as: X means Y;
and, X implies Y. It models the cognitive pro-
cesses as saying, doing and thinking. This paper
presents: a summary of the semiotics used and
introduced; the required semiotic analysis of
the title; a mechanism for representing textual
signs; the repertoires needed to analyze the title
question; an example session; and finally a brief
discussion of its implications.
2. Semiotic Terminology
This section highlights semiotics which has in-
spired the approach in this paper. Mostly, it de-
scribes Peirce’s Semiotic; it is a sprint through
his work, which evolved from 1867 through to
1910. It also mentions Austin’s critique of tra-
ditional linguistic structure, and introduces con-
cept.
This paper draws directly on Peirce’s triadic
Semiotics (Peirce, 1935-57, §2.227-306). In
essence, the connection between the represen-
tamen, or that which acts as the sign, and its ref-
erent object (in this case the utterance and hand
holding state-of-affairs) occurs only through the
mediation of interpretant – the cognitive ar-
tifacts created by the act of interpretation, or
semiosis, which cannot be shared other than
by further representamen and interpretant. In-
terpretant serves as representamen in further,
more developed, signs. This is sometimes re-
ferred to as: denotation, the first meaning; and,
connotation, subsequent, or developed mean-
ings (Hjelmslev, 1961). The sign triad has
been illustrated in (Ogden and Richards, 1923).
The relationship between the Saussurean and
Peircean models is complex, and a mapping be-
tween the two is given in (Tanaka-Ishii, 2010).
Peirce classified each triad component in three
types, each given here in ascending complexity.
A representamen can be: a qualisign, or indi-
vidual quality of a sign; a sinsign, or group of
qualisigns as a single element; or legisign, or
rule governing the use of signs. The manner in
which a representamen refers to its object can
be: iconic, or referring to some physical quality
(color, shape, taste, smell etc); indexical, refer-
ring to some pointer (a weather cock pointing
to the direction of the wind, or a smooth stone
pointing to the action of a river); or symbolic,
a sign referring by convention. An interpretant
can be: a rheme, a timeless sign; a dicent, a his-
torical aspect; or an argument, a hypothetical
sign. He also writes of the ten types of Sign,
being selected from these three classifications
values. Being written in the present tense, the
title question could be seen as a rheme-symbol-
legisign; however, with the first clause defining
a hyperthetical situation, it is argued that the title
question is the most complex sign: argument-
symbol-legisign.
Peirce also talks of ground, what we would call
the medium in which sign systems function. In
this case, the sign system is grounded in natural
language, or utterance.
Semiotics also includes the construction and use
(and the consequences of repeated use) of sign:
Pragmatics. Morris proposed a model of semi-
otics based on the linguistic principles of syn-
tax, semantics and pragmatics (Morris, 1938)
This ties in the traditional linguistic structuring
with pragmatics, which has been a burden ever
since. Meaning cannot be sought from structure
alone – the plane has landed and the Eagle has
landed have the same structure but vastly dif-
ferent meanings. The insertion of pragmatics –
the use of signs – does not counteract the use
of syntax, and its notion that individual words
have means, and this approach is not followed.
Peirce defined three divisions in the develop-
ment of interpretant as: immediate, the initial,
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and not necessarily correct, reaction; dynamic,
the correct reaction to, or functioning of, the
sign; and, final, the habits formed by use of the
sign; e.g. a phrased question, what is your X?,
will have a defined reply framed as my X is...
This paper also draws inspiration from Austin’s
criticism of traditional linguistic methods of
defining language, given in a series of lectures
at Harvard (Austin 1962). Words are not la-
bels for things, only utterances can make sense
in their entirety. Austin’s model of: locution,
speech; illocution, action; and perlocution, re-
action (Austin, 1962 pp. 94–108), is essentially
a triadic model directed towards speech acts: a
given phrase uttered by someone, under certain
conditions, elicits some felicitous response.
Further, conversational interfaces draw on the
Peircean notion of Quasi-mind, as modelled in
(Wheatman, 2011), by a pair of signs arranged
in opposition. The representamen of one be-
ing the object of the other which illustrates the
essence of an information system as a balanc-
ing of interpretant in a process of mirrored de-
notation. This models information systems as
diverse as the request/response conversation of
the HTTP protocol, to the genotype/phenotype
balance of evolutionary biology.
The construction of Signs, and thus the con-
struction of Concepts, is an example of the
notion of autopoiesis, (Maturana and Varela,
1980). This is the ability of a system to self-
create, as compared with the creation of a mate-
rial thing: allopoiesis. The traditional example
is that organisms create organisms, whereas a
car factory is needed to produce cars. Informa-
tion Systems often have an autopoietic nature:
a compiler is usually written in the language
it compiles. There is the temptation to class
autopoiesis in terms of a meta-language; how-
ever, this the language of allopoiesis, since it
would be a different one to the one it describes.
While the autopoiesis repertoire is built into the
language engine, it is not directly used in the
deconstruction of the title question and is not
documented in detail in this paper.
Finally, this paper introduces Concept as a com-
plete group of cooperating signs. Peirce merely
notes that the construction of signs, and their
use and the consequences of repeated use as
Pragmaticism (Peirce, 1935-57 §5.402), are so
named to distinguish his notion from that of
other pragmatists (Thayer, 1982). The notion
here is that different Representamen, which re-
fer to the same Object through a different In-
terpretant, form a repertoire about that Object.
Where that repertoire is deemed to be closed,
or complete, they form a Concept. A simple,
but complete, repertoire may be the concept of
name: my name is X., my name is not X., what is
my name? This is described below in Section 4.
3. Semiotic Analysis of If we are holding
hands...
This section describes the semiotic analysis that
is required by this paper. The difficulty with the
title question is that there are different valid re-
sponses to this. Further, the answer required
can be expressed in many ways; however, it is
not the intention to define one here.
The title question is an analytic one: the answer
can be found within the question, rather than in
referring to known data, or a goal to seek. The
first sign to interpret, therefore, is the question
in its entirety. Being short and easily quotable,
it can act as an example of the type of ques-
tions disembodied intelligence programs have
difficulty in answering. As such, it is an atomic
phrase which is merely in need of recognition
that it has been uttered: precisely. However, the
intention in this paper is to show how it can be
deconstructed to arrive at a logical answer.
In doing so, the first thing to notice is the word
if. From a Computer Science perspective, the
token if, in programming languages, is a divi-
sion in the path of a process to execute either a
then or an else clause, dependent on the value,
zero or non-zero, of the following condition.
In this case however, If... paints a picture of
a hypothetical situation: it says, Once upon a
time... The corollary in computing should not be
the branches of a conditional statement, but of
two branches in a change management system,
where two realities co-exist, until release by the
corollary we are not holding hands.
Such conceptualism allows the deconstruction
of the question into the two utterances, we are
holding hands and whose hand am I holding?
This assertion and question will now be dealt
with in turn, each accessing the conceptualiza-
tion of the holding of hands through separate
repertoires.
44 A Semiotic Analysis of If we are holding hands, whose hand am I holding?
The first sentence uses the phraseholding hands,
which here is atomic as it could be used in sen-
tences such as we are X – where X could be
laughing or crying or, as in this case, holding
hands. In the example given below, it is deemed
to be a special case – as an example of how con-
cepts are informed by concepts. Indeed, it could
be further deconstructed: we may be holding
left and right hands while walking together, or
holding both left/right and left/right in a two
person “ring’o’roses” circle, or even left/left
and right/right in a figure-of-eight – the config-
uration is not specified: we are, for the moment,
merely performing the social construct of hold-
ing hands.
The second sentence is a general doing-to query,
such as whose M is P N? where M and N could
be car and driving, dog and walking, or in this
case hand and holding. This is a general entity’s
action to another entity’s attribute relationship
– the meaning in each case is effectively the
same, other than further implications provided
by the particular entity or action. This is a class
of sentence, or a pattern, which can be applied
to several (many) instances.
The holding of hands can be conceptualized in
a manner which can be used to represent both,
illustrated below. The former atomic phrase can
be represented by the latter’s composite doing-
to terms: if I am holding your hand and you are
holding my hand, then we are holding hands.
Consequently, if we are holding hands, then you
are holdingmy hand and I am holding your hand
– it is a consensual act. Conversely, if we are
not holding hands, either I am not holding your
hand and/or you are not holding my hand.
Finally, the answer will be one of many expres-
sions representing a single concept. The exact
one chosen by the respondent is of no conse-
quence and one is not defined in this paper;
but, it will be aligned to their motive and abil-
ity. It is also worth noting here that we are
effectively playing the Imitation Game (Turing
1950), as one is now offering a hypothetical
state of affairs, rather than operating the Tur-
ing Test, as typically framed (Loebner 2013),
of merely generating conversation, which can
come across as evasive.
4. Semiotic Mechanism
This section describes the utterance processing
mechanism in Peircean terms. The software ar-
chitecture consists of a language engine, which
is configured by a set of text files, known as
repertoires. These describe the various inter-
actions with a concept. A simple, but com-
plete, repertoire may be the concept of name:
my name is X., my name is not X., what is my
name? Repertoire is constructed through its
own repertoire of autopoiesis, which is built
into the engine.
4.1. Sign
A list of signs is built up inside the engine from
their repertoire descriptions. The process of
semiosis amounts to the searching of this list
for an appropriate match and then interpreting
the associated intentions until a felicitous out-
come is achieved. The felicitous nature of the
outcome is maintained throughout the process-
ing of intentions, which is used to determine
the way in which the interpretant is to be fur-
ther used in processing that utterance, see 4.3.
The matching of an utterance against these signs
continues until one is found or all are exhausted:
if none are matched or those found are inappro-
priate, the utterance is deemed not understood.
The default reply, which is independent of the
utterance, is I do not understand, defined in a
configuration file rather than being hard-wired
English. All other replies are provided in the
appropriate interpretant.
4.2. Utterance as Representamen
A representamen is identified by matching the
utterance against the list of signs. It is defined
by a pattern, or phrasal analysis string, defin-
ing that which can be said e.g. my name is X.,
whereby upper-case letters (and words) denote
hot-spots, or variables, and lower-case letters
denote boilerplate, or a constant text value. It
is assumed that this form is commonly under-
stood. The value for each variable is assigned
from the given utterance.
Pattern matching searches all examples and re-
turns the match with the least amount of vari-
ables, to return the most specialized sentence –
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so the utterance the Eagle has landed matches
the eagle has landed before the X has landed,
where X =“eagle”. Further disambiguation can
be obtained by querying object space to de-
termine in what context an utterance is given.
Pattern matching here requires an exact match.
Unlike modern search methods, which usually
remove small words from search terms, contex-
tual words provide useful boilerplate for pattern
matching. Currently, one token in the pattern is
matched with one token in the utterance, unless
it is a hot-spot prefixed by PHRASE-.
4.3. Rules of Natural Language
Interpretation as Interpretant
Interpretation of interpretant occurs once an ut-
terance is matched with a pattern: the inten-
tions of the matched pattern are applied in or-
der. Interpretant is represented as an ordered
bag (i.e. a non-unique list) of attributes, e.g.
name=“value”, or intentions. In that the cog-
nitive process is being modelled, there is a
broad intention classification of thinking, doing
and saying. In the current prototype there are
merely seven intentions: think, perform, and
reply; their infelicitous corollaries elseThink,
elsePerform and elseReply; and, finally. The
felicitous outcome of each intention is main-
tained, and subsequent intentions are applied
appropriately. The notion of an answer is also
maintained from a previous intention, to be in-
serted into the appropriate reply, replacing an
ellipsis. For example, a reply might have the
utterance “your name is...” The seven inten-
tions can be described in the following three
groups.
The content of the think intention, and its corol-
lary elseThink is, privately, and silently, re-
uttered as in the notion of internal thought (Mur-
doch 1970). Thus thinking is modeled as a lin-
guistic process, and the interpretant can thus act
as representamen in further sign triads. Think-
ing propagates the felicity of outcome.
The perform intention and its corollary elsePer-
form, interactswith persistent object space; thus,
the format of its content echoes the format of a
script, where hot-spots are represented as dollar
prefixed variables. The output from a perform
supplies the answer to be replied, and sets the
felicity of outcome. A finally intention, which
is a perform/elsePerform intention, is applied
regardless of the felicitous outcome.
The reply intention, and its corollary elseReply,
formats a reply with the given answer and its
content, a format composed of text and various
object references. When a reply is applied, it is
seen as a got it moment, and all other intentions,
other than the finally intention, are skipped. Re-
plying propagates the felicity of outcome, un-
less it is a (defined) positive reply, I know to a
negative outcome.
4.4. A State of Affairs as Object
A state-of-affairs is composed of a set of persis-
tent non-linear name/value pairs, or attributes.
These are name/value pairs and links between
a name and another name/value pair. Because
these are values and not signs, they can be rea-
soned with, or processed, in much the same way
as can database values. An attribute represents
the basic Saussurean sign pair of Representa-
men/ImmediateObject. The name is structured
around an object model.
Inspiration for this has been taken fromWittgen-
stein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1922), and is
represented by a three-tiered overlaid entity
space, entities; and attributes of values and links
between entities. Overlays represent some level
of reality, and in much the same way as an over-
head projector slide can be overlaid and mod-
ified, while leaving the underlying slide invio-
late; or, as a configuration management system,
e.g. Clearcase (IBM 2013), represents the var-
ious states of a multi-file development. Each
overlay contains environment variables and en-
tities which in turn contains sub-entities, text
values, or entity valued attributes (links to other
entities or sub-entities). In that underlying over-
lays remain inviolate, there is the need to pro-
vide additive-deletions, a placeholder, in the top
overlay to delete entities, which is analogous to
scribbling over an entity in the top overlay only.
A similar mechanism is required for entity re-
naming – a placeholder is provided in the top
overlay to present a new name, and to cover up
the old one. Some mechanism for reconciling
layers is possible, and desirable, but not a yet
implemented nor a priority.
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The conceptualization repertoire is used to in-
teraction with this state-of-affairs allowing ac-
cess via a command line interface. Return val-
ues are: zero, representing false or error; non-
zero, representing true; or, a pointer to a string.
Conceptualization scripts are specified in the
perform and finally intentions. Object refer-
ences here are represented by dollar-preceded
lower case forms, emphasizing its scripting her-
itage. It is from this conceptualization that an-
swers are obtained, which are then formatted
by a following reply intention. In order to insu-
late the user from having to write such scripts,
there is an interface to this object component
written using the think intention, and hence in
natural language. This is encapsulated within
the concept of conceptualization (concepts are
introduced below).
The desire for a simple conceptualization model
over an enriched one means the underlying en-
tity model does not directly support the Object-
Oriented model of classes, instances, inheri-
tance and such like. The model contains en-
tities, attributes (values or links) and a mecha-
nism for transitive links, from which an object
model is created by the concepts of has and isa.
These repertoires are detailed further in Sec-
tion 5, although they are not directly used in the
deconstruction of the title question.
4.5. Concept – a Group of Cooperating
Signs
This project uses the notion of concept as a
complete group of cooperating signs, or reper-
toires. A concept may effectively be merely
a sinsign; however, working at a conventional
level, it would have to be a legisign. A portion
of a state-of-affairs is managed through a reper-
toire, much in the same way a programming
language class is a set of members managed
through an interface. The concept relative-to is
managed by being able to say, e.g., X is REL
than Y; or, is X REL than Y? where REL is
larger, taller, heavier, or whatever other rela-
tive value introduced by further repertoire. The
concepts required to perform the analysis of the
title question are described in Section 5.
5. Repertoires
The question has been analyzed, satisfactorily,
into an assertion and a question within a con-
ceptual framework; the repertoires to exploit
this analysis are now described. For brevity,
the given examples are the phrasal analysis pat-
terns extracted from the full repertoires, apart
from the last which is the full repertoire. It is
assumed, also for brevity, that the conceptual-
ization concept is defined elsewhere, construct-
ing the repertoire of object space, e.g. X exists!
delete X X exists? etc. to encapsulate (most)
perform intentions. There follow descriptions
of the general concepts of: isa and has con-
structing the repertoire of the object model –
both using this conceptualization; and then ac-
tion, which is used to implement concept of
holding hands. Both of these are then used
within a framework provided by the concept
of conceptualism. Finally, there is an example
session presented showing the resolution of the
title question.
5.1. The Isa and Has Repertoires
A simplistic object model is represented by the
isa and has repertoires, both making use of
the conceptualization repertoire. This proves
useful in modeling real-world objects, as it ab-
stracts away the need to know of implemen-
tation details. The semiotic approach can be
described as being itself in some way polymor-
phic, since the actions associated with an ut-
terance are connotative: they are connected, or
linked, through a third connection, rather than
being denoted, or directly linked. The isa reper-
toire is as follows:
CLASS is a class.
is ENTITY a class?
what is a CLASS?
what is a class?
a DERIVED is a BASE.
is a DERIVED a BASE?
OBJECT is a CLASS.
is OBJECT a CLASS?
what is OBJECT?
The isa repertoire is reasonably straightforward,
given that the presence, or absence, of the boil-
erplate a prior to a hot-spot points to it being a
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concrete object or an abstract object, or class,
respectively. The first six utterances manage
the class network by simple accumulation.
The what is a class? utterance is complete boil-
erplate giving the ability to provide an explana-
tion of the meta-class class. Class is not itself
a class, it is the meta-class, the class of classes.
As such, the utterance a person specifies any
of the entities which inherit from the class per-
son, whereas a class does not specify all entities
which inherit from class. Consider the utterance
a person has a name meaning that the class per-
son is attributed with a name value, whereas a
class has a name does not have the same mean-
ing – which would mean that all entities have
a name. The last three utterances manage in-
stances of classes.
The has repertoire is as follows:
a CLASS has a MEMBER.
can a CLASS have a MEMBER?
Does OBJECT have a MEMBER?
is ENTITY’s MEMBER VALUE?
ENTITY’s MEMBER is VALUE.
ENTITY’s MEMBER is QUOTED-VALUE.
what is ENTITY’s MEMBER?
ENTITY’s MEMBER’s ATTRIBUTE is VALUE.
what MEMBER is ENTITY’s OBJECT?
The first three utterances deal with the attri-
bution of members to classes. The remainder
deals with assigning values to entity’s members
in various forms. This may be incomplete given
the many ways values can be assigned; the last
two, for example, deal with the dereferencing
entities, such as in the utterance Freddie’s car’s
color is red. While more work is due here, the
repertoire is sufficient for the title question as it
stands.
5.2. The Action Repertoire
The first utterance in the action repertoire is
an utterance required for the concept, which is
matched and conceptualized by the isa concept
as described above:
Action is a class.
Then, for the purposes of this paper, there is a
small set ofmulti-intention patterns created here
at load time by autopoietic utterances. Further
deconstruction may show that this concept can
be split into a further base/derived pairs; how-
ever, for the purpose of this paper, this repertoire
is complete.
X is not DOING anything.
X is DOING Y’s OBJECT.
X is not DOING Y’s OBJECT.
Whose OBJECT is X DOING?
What is X DOING?
Is X DOING Y’s OBJECT?
Looking at the first of these in detail, as an ex-
ample, it is constructed by the three autopoietic
utterances:
On “X is not DOING anything.”, perform “link destroy
$x $doing”.
Then on “X is not DOING anything.”, if not, reply “I
cannot destroy a link between X and DOING”.
Then on “X is not DOING anything.”, reply “ok”.
“X is not DOING anything.” implies “is DOING an
action?”; if not, reply “DOING is not an action”.
“X is not DOING anything.” implies “is X a person?”; if
not, reply “X is not a person”.
This shows one advantage of such an approach;
while complex, these utterances read as natural
English – much in the same way as COBOL
is created as a subset of English: not everyone
will be able to create these patterns, but most
should be able to read them.
Once these concept construction utterances have
been issued, on being presented with Fred is not
holding anything, the analysis proceeds as fol-
lows. First, the interpreter checks that Fred is a
known person – the implies intentions are added
to the front of the list. If this is felicitous, then
this is followed by a check to show that the
hotspot holding is an action. Both of these are
relying on a concept of isa and ultimately on the
contextual state-of-affairs.
Finally, if these implications are both felicitous,
the conceptual state of affairs is affected to rep-
resent the message within Fred is not holding
anything. In this case (as it is implemented in
the current prototype) this is the command to
remove the holding link from the entity fred.
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5.3. The Holding Hands Repertoire
In specifying the concept of holding hands, the
first two utterances, interpreted at load time, de-
fine some necessary context for the concept of
holding hands:
Holding is an action.
A person has a hand.
Note that, for the purpose of this paper, we are
not concerned with the number of hands a per-
son has. These are followed by five concept
specific patterns which are utterances supported
by the action concept. In brief:
X is holding hands with Y.
X is not holding hands with Y.
Is X holding hands with Y ?
We are holding hands.
We are not holding hands.
Finally, there is an equivalence intention, which
strictly is not required for the given example,
but completes the repertoire, being the inquisi-
tive corollary to we are holding hands and we
are not holding hands. In full, it is:
“Are we holding hands?” means “Are you holding hands
with me?”.
5.4. The Conceptualism Repertoire
Finally, to fully address the title question, there
is the concept of conceptualism. To resolve
the title question, this repertoire combines the
two sentences resolved from the initial semiotic
analysis given in Section 3. It consists of a sin-
gle utterance containing two phrases: if X, Y?
Since it does not depend on these phrases, it can
also be said to be polymorphic.
In a more comprehensive system, the value of
X can be obtained to resolve ambiguity with ut-
terances such as if someone is greater than your
eye-level, they are tall, which serves as a rule to
be applied to further entities.
The full repertoire is thus:
On “if PHRASE-X , PHRASE-Y?”, perform “overlay
create”.
Then on “if PHRASE-X , PHRASE-Y?”, think “X”.
Then on “if PHRASE-X , PHRASE-Y?”, if not, reply “I
do not understand: ’X’ ”.
Then on “if PHRASE-X , PHRASE-Y?”, think “Y?”.
Finally on “if PHRASE-X , PHRASE-Y?”, perform
“overlay destroy”.
The initial perform creates an overlay within
which to imagine the following conceptualiza-
tions. The pattern matching algorithm uses the
phrase attribute, forced by the PHRASE- pre-
fix, to look for a multi-word target, where they
are terminated by the first token in the outer
pattern’s prefix tokens, in this case ‘,’ and ‘?’
The full stop (period) in the think utterance
is added by default; question and exclamation
marks must be added in the second think explic-
itly. The finally intention destroys the overlay,
leaving the original state undisturbed. This is
illustrated in the following session.
5.5. A Resultant Session
This paper documents a second working pro-
totype, originally (Wheatman, 2013), with im-
proved Interpretant representation. The name,
enguage is derived from language engine, and
has been developed and tested in Java, under
Ubuntu 12.04. The output from a session fol-
lows. By arriving at one of many possible an-
swers, it illustrates an understanding of the title
question.
In this example, the user’s typing is highlighted
in italic. The -v is the switch to enable ver-
bose mode; English refers to a folder contain-
ing the concept repertoires: we may equally
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have Spanish, On “¿Dónde está el OBJETO”,
think... The first and third utterances are to show
that the initial and final states of affairs remain
unchanged due to the finally intention tearing
down the overlay. The second utterance, the
title question, builds this overlay in which to
assert, or imagine, the hand-holding situation,
and to interrogate this situation.
6. Discussion
This discussion attempts to draw out some of the
implications of this work in relation to natural
language processing and the practical applica-
tion of this, and further, work.
Firstly, the goal of this project is to produce
a passive linguistic information system – ca-
pable of deconstructing the title – rather than
claiming to feel emotions or attempting to act
intelligently. The analogy here being the loyal
butler, Mr. Stevens (Ishiguro 1989), it follows
a radical semiotic approach to language in that
it is not the written words that contain meaning,
but utterances in their entirety. This is radical
in that it follows Peirce’s general triadic model
of signs, and does not use the traditional lin-
guistic parlance of syntax and semantics. In
this sense, an utterance is a sign in much the
same way as any other sensory experience, if
more complex and directed. Syntax, and by ex-
tension semantics, are language and therefore
culturally dependent, whereas the mechanism
developed here is independent of a given lan-
guage. Further, meaning is arbitrary and based
on subjective interpretant: two similar phrases
can have widely different meanings, such as in
the plane has landed, a mundane and everyday
occurrence, and the Eagle has landed, an iconic
moment of the 20th century. This approach ap-
pears to be grasped by other works (Ogden and
Richard, 1923), and also in the dyadic model
(Saussure, 1915) in that words are not merely
labels for things. It is worth noting that the
terms Syntax and Semantics were introduced to
semiotics (Morris, 1938), by aligning their use
with Pragmatics as a third level – the practical
use of Syntax and Semantics. This is not to den-
igrate Morris’s work entirely, people who have
extended Morris’s work certainly have grasped
this notion, especially (Stamper, 1985): Mor-
ris uses these words in a semiotic context. A
further critique of traditional approaches to lan-
guage (Austin, 1962), which refutes the use of
the parlance of word types, such as nouns and
verbs, arrives at a similar triadic model of lan-
guage based on language as action. A final note
on interpretant, the repertoire, as used in this
paper, can be defined as final interpretant as it
represents habit – the normal way to do things.
Moving back into dynamic and immediate inter-
pretant suggests working with the development
of new language and new habit. This is left to
further research.
There is a marked difference in this approach
to that taken by ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966),
and thus many natural language processing pro-
grams produced for (Loebner, 2013), whereby
output is generated from input, although there is
an attempt to determine output without the gen-
eration of a formal syntax tree. While it does
not formally define a sentence structure, ELIZA
effectively uses the structure of the utterance in
turning it around for output. Thus, I am feeling
X becomes why are you feeling X. The language
engine, through its interpretant, has access to a
rudimentary object database, and so an ability to
understand, in some respect, and to reason with
an internal real-world model. Thus it also has
the ability to specify further questions, based
on input, which can eventually be answered by
more rudimentary understanding and therefore
an ability to deconstruct. While it is entirely
possible that commercial IVR systems could
be programmed to deal with such complexity,
none are. It is presumed that since they interact
with databases of real-world data, theywill have
some of the features described in this paper, but
will not be described in semiotic terms.
While it is not described in detail in this pa-
per, this system is autopoietic since repertoires
are constructed from an in-built repertoire of
thirteen utterances. Because of its autopoietic
nature, the language can be enhanced and ex-
tended, the loading and unloading of the appro-
priate repertoires gives room for development.
Further, such additions are not saved to persis-
tent store – so on re-running the software any
additional repertoire extentions will need to be
reloaded. There is not a great amount of work
involved in persisting added language, since the
shape of a repertoire is similar to the nature of
states of affairs – objects and their attributes.
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One possible downside of the closed approach
is that the language is seen as limited – limited
to the language defined within the repertoires:
it is not a work of arbitrary language interpre-
tation. However, this is not a great problem, it
is simply a sign that this is a constructive ap-
proach: as language develops in a child, or a
non-native speaker, it develops through being
useful – there is no need for a full understand-
ing of a given language before portions of it
work. Indeed, taken to its extreme, everyone’s
language can be regarded as limited by their
own experience, and the language specifications
begun here are the first tentative steps. For ex-
ample, one system knowing of location need
not know how to converse on relative height.
One mark of the utility of this work is if a sin-
gle concept repertoire works, which could be
seen as the basic autopoiesis repertoire upon
which all other repertoires are defined. Further,
this closed nature of repertoires fit the nature
of work situations, of non-social verbal interac-
tions – of information exchange. This can be
seen in the manner in which Mr. Stevens (Ishig-
uro, 1989) is of use through verbal interaction,
but does not respond to arbitrary language –
especially the scene where the butler is asked
to comment on international politics. Indeed,
as a freelance Software Engineer the author’s
career has largely depended on the learning of
the closed repertoires of different clients’ in-
dustries, and being able to conceptualize this in
source code. While this claim of a closed nature
is intended to cover information systems and
not real-world work interactions, such as the
garage workshop example (Andersen, 1997),
this could even be seen as possible, given an in-
terface to some armed mechanic and the reper-
toire of, for example, moving and item through
3D-space: to you, to me, up a bit. Much in the
same way as an information system could be
taught to record phenomenal experience, with-
out access to that experience; what is needed
here, however, is trust. Another area for further
research is the ability of this system to cope
with longer, more intricate, utterances: through
the ability to deconstruct utterances into sim-
pler forms. One application of this is the use
of descriptive words to identify an entity, such
as the tall boy, rather than an entity identifier
(note the lexicon of noun, adjectives and noun-
phrase is not used here). The description is as
dependent on the entity, as the use of an entity
identifier within an utterance. Can a repertoire
be developed to deconstruct sentences?
Analytic questions are of little use; certainly,
they are trivial for the human. This paper has
shown, however, the solving of analytic ques-
tions, certainly of the form if... then...?, is also
straightforward in software. So now a small
closed repertoire example of this language en-
gine is being sought as proof of its wider appli-
cation. The one proposed is that of a shopping
list – with a simple repertoire of I need X, I have
X and what do I need. It is envisaged that an in-
dividual will nominate things required by I need
X: thus a list is composed. On shopping, the in-
dividual can ask what do I need? and can obtain
these items. On acquiring these items, they can
be removed from the list by uttering we have X:
thus the list is managed and the functionality of
data cumulation of a notepad application is sur-
passed. Work on implementing this is currently
underway.
Finally, a definition of the word understand-
ing, in its linguistic context (with one caveat)
can be asserted as the ability to conceptualize
– to retain (remember and recall) and to rea-
son through a given utterance. For example, we
may be holding hands, and as such, it may be
understood by this concept that I am holding
your hand and you are holding my hand. How-
ever, if the fact is given that I am holding your
hand but you are not holding my hand, we may
not be holding hands: you may be holding a
gun with which you are attempting to shoot me!
Such subtlety in state-of-affairs is possible, and
it is important to be able to understand, along
with the ability to determine if something is not
understood.
The caveat is that this is adequate understand-
ing: Peirce notes (Peirce 1935-57) that the
rapport between speaker and listener defines a
Quasi-mind, and that understanding is judged
by the extent to which this Quasi-mind works.
7. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a mechanism which
effectively comprehends a complex question,
allowing a user, via a command line interface,
to set up and interrogate a given state of affairs.
Working on an analytic question may seem of
little value, since they are trivial to comprehend;
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it serves as a good depth test for this natural lan-
guage understanding mechanism. One key fea-
ture, though not described in detail, is that lan-
guage here is seen as self-describing. Further
work, as described in the last section, involves
utilizing the text-to-speech and speech-to-text
facilities provided by mobile devices. The goals
include: in the long term, an open ended inter-
pretation of natural language; and the shorter
term goals are creating a full vocal interface to
a common application – a shopping list, and de-
veloping the management of repertoires. This
work is applicable to human-computer interac-
tion, especially with groups difficult to reach,
such as the visually impaired, dyslexic, illiter-
ate and the elderly.
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